History has been kind to the American generals of World War II and less kind to the generals of the wars that followed. Setting out to explain why, Thomas E. Ricks cites a widening gulf between performance and accountability. Then, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough. Today, as one American colonel said bitterly, "A private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

Includes bibliographical references.

World War II General George C. Marshall : the leader Dwight Eisenhower : how the Marshall system worked George Patton : the specialist Mark Clark : the man in the middle "Terrible Terry" Allen : conflict between Marshall and his protégés Eisenhower manages Montgomery Douglas MacArthur : the general as presidential aspirant William Simpson : the Marshall system and the new model American general The Korean War William Dean and Douglas MacArthur : two generals self-destruct Army generals fail at Chosin O. P. Smith succeeds at Chosin Ridgway turns the war around MacArthur's last stand The organization man's army The Vietnam War Maxwell Taylor : architect of defeat William Westmoreland : the organization man in command

William DePuy : World War II-style generalship in Vietnam The collapse of generalship in the 1960s At the top In the field In personnel policy Tet '68 : the end of Westmoreland and the turning point of the war My Lai : General Koster's cover-up and General Peers's investigation The end of a war, the end of an army Interwar DePuy's great rebuilding "How to teach judgment" Iraq and the hidden costs of rebuilding Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and the empty triumph of the 1991 war The ground war : Schwarzkopf vs. Frederick Franks The post-Gulf War military Tommy R. Franks : two-time loser Ricardo Sanchez : over his head George Casey : trying but treading water David Petraeus : an outlier moves in, then leaves.